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Abstract: The paper discusses the structure, applications, and plausibility of the much-used 
parallel-case argument for workplace democracy. The argument rests on an analogy between 
firms and states according to which the justification of democracy in the state implies its 
justification in the workplace. The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, the argument is 
illustrated by applying it to two usual objections to workplace democracy, namely, that 
employees lack the expertise required to run a firm and that only capital suppliers should have a 
say over the governance of the firm. Second, the structure of the argument is unfolded. Third, two 
salient similarities between firms and states regarding their internal and external effects and the 
standing of their members are addressed in order to asses the potential and limits of the argument, 
as well as three relevant differences regarding the voluntariness of their membership, the 
narrowness of their goals, and the stiffness of the competition they face. After considering these 
similarities and differences, the paper contends that the the parallel-case argument provides a 
sound reason in favor of democracy in the workplace—a reason, however, that needs to be 
importantly qualified and that is only pro tanto. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last decades democracy has rapidly expanded worldwide. While in 1946 only 20 out of 
71 independent states were democratic, the number increased to 48 in 1989, to 77 in 1994, and to 
92 in 2009 (Marshall and Cole 2009: 10-11). The expansion of democracy in the state, however, 
has not gone hand-in-hand with a parallel expansion of democracy in other realms, such as the 
workplace.1 Rather the contrary. The number of cooperatives may have decreased over the last 
decades.2 And attempts to extend the German system of co-determination have either been 
blocked—as in the case of the Fifth Directive drafted by the European Community in the 
1970s—or failed altogether—as in the case of the Bullock Report in the UK (Gold, 2005; 2010). 
Further, once a battle cry among workers and a central research topic in industrial relations, labor 
economics, and political philosophy (Christie 1984: 112-128), since the 1980s workplace 
democracy has attracted a declining interest among scholars, political parties, and workers alike.  
Yet, the recent resilience of co-operatives to the Great Recession has strengthened their 
presence in the world economy, and has aroused the interest in this and other forms of workplace 
democracy once again (Birchall and Ketilson 2009; Lansbury 20009; Birchall 2013). Some recent 
philosophical work on economic and workplace democracy has also contributed to the debate 
(Hsieh, 2008; Schaff, 2012; Perry, 2014; Anderson, forthcoming; Landemore and Ferreras, 
unpublished; see also the essays in Gosseries and Ponthiere, 2008; and O’Neill and Williamson, 
2012: Part II). 
Among those who have championed the idea, some have called into question the consistency 
between the widespread commitment to democracy in the state and the skepticism with which its 
extension to the workplace is nowadays received. Indeed, it has been argued that firms’ decisions 
influence workers’ lives as much as governments’ decisions; that managers have as much power 
over workers as public officials have over citizens; or that large companies influence the society 
as much as the state does.3 From this point of view, non-democratic firms have sometimes been 
depicted as autocratic institutions within which the economy is centrally planned, freedom of 
movement and speech is heavily constrained, and failure to obey can result in instant exile.4 
                                                
1 Democracy is minimally defined throughout the paper as a form of collective decision-making that gives a binding 
say to all the affected and/or subjected individuals on a roughly equal basis. 
2 For some evidence in the US farming context, see United States Department of Agriculture (2004). 
3 For references, see section 4, in which these arguments are discussed. 
4 Noam Chomsky (1998: 19) has expressed this view as follows: “What kind of freedom is there inside a 
corporation? They’re totalitarian institutions – you take orders from above and maybe give them to people below 
you. There’s about as much freedom as under Stalinism.” 
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However, there may be good reasons against democracy in the workplace that do not apply to 
the state, and the converse may also be true. Indeed, it has been often claimed that firms and 
states are too different for the analogy between them to work. For example, it has been argued 
that firms are voluntary associations while states are not, that firms are for-profit while states are 
not, and that firms are meritocratic while states are not.5 
The goal of this paper is to analyze the structure, applications, and limits of the analogy 
between states and firms that is often used to argue for workplace democracy, i.e. what Joshua 
Cohen (1989) has labeled as the parallel-case argument for workplace democracy.6 According to 
this argument, firms and states have a number of similarities that make any argument against 
workplace democracy plausible either in both realms or in neither realm. In this paper I will 
advance a qualified defense of the parallel-case argument. As I shall argue, firms and states are 
analogous regarding two salient features (their internal effects and the exercise of power within 
them). In addition, I will address a number of potential differences between them (regarding the 
voluntariness of their membership, the narrowness of their goals, and the toughness of the 
competition they face) that may block the analogy on which the argument is based. I will contend 
that, while relevant, these differences are often overdrawn, for they are of degree, not of kind. I 
will conclude that the parallel-case argument provides a sound, yet qualified and non-decisive, 
basis in favor of workplace democracy. 
The paper is divided into five further sections. Section 2 briefly defines workplace democracy 
and illustrates the parallel-case argument by applying it to two common arguments against 
workplace democracy. Section 3 unfolds the structure of the argument. Section 4 discusses two 
salient analogies, while section 5 tackles three potential differences between firms and states. A 
conclusion closes the paper. 
 
2. THE PARALLEL-CASE ARGUMENT AT WORK 
 
This section has two goals. It firstly introduces the definition of workplace democracy that will 
be used throughout the paper. It then illustrates the parallel-case argument by applying it to two 
influential arguments against workplace democracy. (Those who are familiar with these issues 
may want to directly turn to section 3). Workplace democracy is defined as follows: 
                                                
5 For references, see section 5, in which these arguments are discussed. 
6 The argument has been most recently employed by Schaff (2012), and assessed by Landemore and Ferreras 
(unpublished). The classice references defending it are Walzer (1983) and Dahl (1985). For a detailed critique, see 
López-Guerra (2008). 
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Workplace democracy: A form of managerial organization in which workers have 
control rights over the management of the firm.  
 
Workplace democracy has developed into many different forms since its nineteenth-century 
origins, including Robert Owen’s cooperative experiments, the Israeli kibbutzim, the German co-
determination system, and the US Employee Stock Ownership Plans (Dow, 2003; Hansmann, 
2000; Wilkinson et al., 2010: part III). The above definition is, thus, a fairly minimal and 
inclusive one. Even though it rules out forms of participation that are limited to employee 
information, communication, and/or consultation, it leaves open a large number of issues 
regarding the goals, procedures, and boundary conditions of workplace democracy. It also leaves 
open the relationship between ownership and control rights. Hence, under this definition workers 
are not required to have a share in the ownership of the firm in order to be granted control rights. 
They may be granted control rights either qua owners or qua workers.  
The best-known instance of the first alternative is co-operativism, in which workers—and only 
workers—have equal control rights and supply capital, e.g. via debt contracting or by drawing 
upon their own savings.7 Co-determination, on the other hand, provides the closest instance of the 
second alternative, in which workers are granted control rights without making any equity 
investment in the firm.8 
Many arguments have been advanced in favor of these and other forms of workplace 
democracy.9 Unlike other arguments, the appeal the parallel-case argument is that, by tracing a 
tight analogy between firms and states, it moves the debate on the desirability of workplace 
democracy to the political realm, in which the desirability of democracy is taken for granted. In 
addition, since some of the arguments that are used nowadays against workplace democracy are 
very similar to arguments that were once used against democracy in the state yet are now seen as 
unacceptable and anachronistic, the parallel-case argument suggests that we may be using such 
                                                
7 However, as Elster (1989) recalls, only rarely we find cooperatives so-defined, for non-working owners, non-
owning workers, and unequal distribution of shares are common. 
8 The best-known case of co-determination is the German system (Dow, 2003: chapter 4; Fitzroy and Kraft, 2005). 
In force since 1976, it makes compulsory for all limited liability firms with over 2,000 workers to have a supervisory 
board with ample powers (e.g. the approval of the annual budget or the ratification of important investments) in 
which both shareholders and workers are represented on a “near-parity” basis (because exclusively the shareholders 
elect the chairman of the board, who has a tie-breaking vote). For a theoretical model of co-determination with a 
more equal distribution of control rights among shareholders and employees, see Ferreras (2012).  
9 For overviews of recent normative debates, see Dow (2003: chapter 2), Hsieh (2008), and González-Ricoy (2010). 
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arguments uncritically. 
In order to illustrate this, let us assume for a moment that the argument is sound, and briefly 
apply it to two usual arguments against workplace democracy, namely, that employees often lack 
the expertise required to run a firm (call it the epistemic argument) and that only shareholders 
should have control rights for they are the only suppliers of capital (call it the argument from 
capital supply). (Just to be clear, in this section I will not assess the merits of the parallel-case 
argument, something that will only be done in the next section. I only show how the argument 
could be used if it were sound.) 
 
2.1. The epistemic argument 
 
Firms are complex institutions that operate in constantly changing economic environments. Their 
management involves decisions about investment policies, production engineering, contracting, 
compensation, and budgetary planning, among many other technical and complex issues. Why, 
then, should workers be granted a say in their governance when they often lack the expertise 
required to make informed decisions about such issues? As an executive commented, “What? 
And let the monkeys run the zoo!” (quoted in Christie, 1984: 115). According to the epistemic 
argument, 
 
(A1)  Complex institutions should not be governed by those who lack the expertise to 
govern them sufficiently well (i.e. to at least some specific level of competency).  
(A2)  Firms are complex institutions and workers lack the expertise to govern them 
sufficiently well. 
 
Therefore,  
 
(A3)  Firms should not be governed by their workers. 
 
However, consistently extended, (A1) allows for an analogous criticism of democracy in the 
state. Put simply,  
 
(A4)  States are also complex institutions and not all citizens have the political expertise 
required to govern them sufficiently well.  
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Therefore,  
 
(A5)  States should not be governed by all their citizens. 
 
As we shall see below in section 3, it is possible to resist (A5) by claiming that (A1) applies 
differently to firms and states due to certain relevant differences between them. For example, 
efficiency may be crucial in the firm yet not in the state and, accordingly, expertise may be 
crucial in governing the firm yet not in governing the state. Since the goal of this subsection is 
just to illustrate how the parallel-case argument could be employed if it were sound, let us assume 
that (A1) applies equally to both domains. Two possible reactions follow to (A5). On the one 
hand, it is possible to accept (A1)-(A5). This was common until not so long ago. For instance, in 
defending the restoration of suffrage restrictions in France right after the Thermidorian coup of 
1794, Boissy d’Anglas (1795) famously stated that “we must be governed by the best, and the 
best are the more educated.” Jason Brennan (2011) has recently argued similarly. However, on 
the other hand, it is possible to deny that it is permissible to disenfranchise some group of voters 
regardless of how competently they cast their vote, thus rejecting (A5), which most of us would 
nowadays do. Now, from the latter option it follows that, if (A2) is true, then 
 
(A6)  (A1) should be rejected, i.e. expertise should not be a necessary condition for the 
governance of complex institutions. 
 
It may be further replied that (A1)-(A5) is too radical an argument, for some degree of insulation 
of expertise from democratic control may not be at odds with political equality, as the insulation 
of central banks and constitutional courts from parliamentary decision-making in most 
democracies proves. This is surely a controversial argument, since it might be argued that the 
insulation of expertise from democratic control does pose a constraint on political equality, even 
though such constraint may be justified for reasons other than political equality. However, for 
present purposes, it is irrelevant whether the argument is sound or not. For, even if it were, it 
would also apply to firms, given that certain tasks can also be insulated from workers’ control in 
democratic firms. Jeffrey Moriarty (2007: 344) has made the following claim along those lines: 
“It would be just as unwise to allow employees to elect their firm’s Chief Financial Officer as it 
would be to allow citizens to elect their country’s Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.” 
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The parallel-case argument does not imply that democratic firms ought to include this sort of 
insulation. It only shows that the scope and limits of democracy and the precise mechanisms of 
accountability that are to be used are as up for grabs in democratic firms as they are in democratic 
states. As Walzer (1983: 302) points out, “in a developed economy, as in a developed polity, 
different decisions are made by different groups of people at different levels of society. The 
division of power in both cases is only in part a matter of principle; it is also a matter of 
circumstance and convenience.” 
 
2.2. The argument from capital supply  
 
The parallel-case argument can be similarly applied to the argument against workplace 
democracy from capital supply, according to which workers should not be granted control rights 
over the governance of the firm because they supply labor but not capital. Workers can always 
choose to work for democratic firms, take over their own firm in case it goes bankrupt, or try to 
get a majority of its voting shares. As Nozick (1974: 250) put it, “persons may form their own 
democratically-run cooperative firms. It is open to any wealthy radical or group of workers to 
buy an existing factory or establish a new one, and to institute their favorite microindustrial 
scheme; for example, worker-controlled, democratically-run firms.” In capitalist firms, however, 
shareholders supply capital. Accordingly, only they should govern the firm. In short, according to 
the argument from capital supply,  
 
(B1)  Only those who supply capital should govern the firm.  
(B2)  Workers supply labor but not capital to the firm.  
 
Therefore,  
 
(B3)  Workers should not govern the firm. 
 
Before turning to the parallel-case argument against (B3), the following caveat is required. Even 
if we accepted that only shareholders should have control rights over the governance of the firm, 
it might be argued that workplace democracy need not trump such rights, for it need not be 
compulsory. True, some (for example, Cohen, 1989) have argued for an inalienable right to 
workplace democracy. Yet it might be argued that workplace democracy can be implemented 
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gradually and voluntarily, by means of providing legal advice, tax benefits, or direct subsidies to 
democratic firms, rather than, say, through expropriation or prohibition of non-democratic ones 
(see Bowles and Gintis, 1996: 66). Now, even when workplace democracy is not compulsory, a 
rationale is still required to justify why the state should promote democratic firms at the expense 
of non-democratic ones. To be sure, there is a notable difference between using state coercion to 
ban non-democratic firms, on the one hand, and using its public resources to promote democratic 
firms at the expense of non-democratic ones. However, in both cases public means are used to 
benefit one managerial option at the expense of the other. Hence, the argument from capital 
supply still poses a potential threat to the justification of a non-mandatory-yet-publicly-promoted 
workplace democracy.10 
Let us now go back to premise (B1), according to which supply of capital implies exclusive 
control rights over the governance of the firm. As in the case of (A1), consistently extended, (B1) 
leads to a similar criticism in the political realm. The following one:  
 
(B4)  Not all citizens contribute equally to the revenue of the state, if at all.  
 
Therefore,  
 
(B5)  Not all citizens should govern the state. 
 
Again, assume that firms and states are similarly enough for (B1) to apply to both realms. If so, 
we are again faced with two options. On the one hand, we can accept (B5). This has been a usual 
way to argue for property and tax qualifications for voting throughout history. John Jay’s 
“favorite maxim,” according to which “those who own the country ought to govern it,” largely 
expressed what was common sense until nineteenth- and twentieth-century extensions of the 
franchise (Jay, 1833: 70). Few would accept (B5) nowadays though. Now, if we reject (B5), then 
it follows that  
 
(B6)  Premise (B2) should also be rejected, i.e. supply of capital should not be a 
necessary condition to govern the firm. 
 
3. THE STRUCTURE OF THE PARALLEL-CASE ARGUMENT 
                                                
10 I am grateful to Joseph Mazor for pressing me to clarify this. 
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As we have just seen, by tracing a close analogy between firms and states, the parallel-case 
argument pushes the debate on the desirability of democracy in the workplace to the political 
realm, in which democracy is the default normative position. Further, since some of the 
arguments that are used nowadays against democracy in the workplace, such as the epistemic 
argument and the argument from capital supply, closely resemble arguments that were once used 
against democracy in the state yet few would accept nowadays, the argument suggests that we 
may be using such arguments uncritically. In this section I unfold the structure of the argument.  
Robert Dahl (1985: 111) provides the best-known account of the parallel-case argument, 
according to which “If democracy is justified in governing the state, then it must also be justified 
in governing economic enterprises; and to say that it is not justified in governing economic 
enterprises is to imply that it is not justified in governing the state.” Of course, the second 
sentence is redundant. It is just a different yet logically equivalent way to express the material 
conditional stated in the previous sentence, namely, that 
 
Parallel-case argument: If democracy is justified in governing the state, then it is 
justified in governing economic enterprises. 
 
Further, even though Dahl formulates it in merely conditional terms, his discussion of the PCA 
favors a biconditional conclusion. As López-Guerra (2008: 15) points out, it would be certainly 
awkward if Dahl agreed that democracy could be justified in the workplace yet not in the state, as 
mere conditionality implies. Even though the previous definition of the argument is enough for 
the goals of this paper, the following modified version of it follows: 
 
Strong parallel-case argument: Democracy is justified in governing the state if and 
only if it is justified in governing economic enterprises. 
 
What links the antecedent and the consequent is that economic enterprises and states are taken 
to be analogous in some morally relevant sense. The parallel-case argument is thus an analogical 
argument. It refers to some similarities between two objects or systems of objects—namely, firms 
and states—in support of the conclusion that some further similarity exists (see Bartha, 2010: 
 10 
chapter 1). It unfolds as follows: 
 
(C1) Economic enterprises are similar to the state regarding certain features. 
(C2)  Such features are individually sufficient to justify democracy in governing the state. 
  
Therefore,  
 
(C3)  Such features are individually sufficient to justify democracy in governing economic 
enterprises. 
 
For this version of the argument to avoid being invalid, at least one further condition needs to 
obtain. In addition to their similarity regarding certain features that are sufficient to justify 
democracy in the state, firms and states ought to be similar regarding the absence of a number of 
aspects that may block the justification of democracy in either realm. For example, it may be the 
case that being subject to certain form of power by public officials is sufficient to justify 
democracy in the state, and that managers exercise the same sort of power in the firm. However, 
it may also be the case that democracy is inappropriate to govern firms because of the stiff 
competition they face in the market, while it is not to govern the state because states do not face 
such competition in the international sphere, and that this difference is sufficiently strong to 
override the similarity regarding the sort of power exercised in both spheres. 
In the next section I will consider two potentially relevant similarities between firms and 
states—regarding their effects and regarding the standing of their members. In the next one, I will 
turn to three potentially defeating differences between states and economic enterprises. Before 
turning to these similarities and differences, a caveat is nonetheless in order.11  
The plausibility of the conclusions drawn from the argument depends on the moral relevance 
of the similarities and differences under consideration for the justification of democracy in either 
realm. Hence, it might be argued that the features considered below in this section—even when 
similarly present in firms and states—are irrelevant for the justification of workplace democracy 
because different governance schemes (notably, workplace democracy and political democracy) 
ought to be assessed according different moral criteria. An argument of this type has been 
advanced by López-Guerra (2008), who concedes that firms and states might be similar regarding 
one of the features that will be considered below, namely the exercise of power within them. Yet, 
                                                
11 I am grateful to a referee for this journal for pressing me to introduce this caveat. 
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he argues, economic justice, and not the exercise of power, should be the criterion employed in 
assessing the organization of the firm. Accordingly, the parallel-case argument fails because it 
overlooks the possibility that certain features that are morally relevant for the assessment of some 
governance schemes may be irrelevant—or not relevant enough to override some further 
differences that are morally more relevant—when assessing other schemes. 
Two replies can be advanced. The first one is that López-Guerra’s argument is compatible 
with the argument presented in this paper. The reason for this is that here I assume a pluralistic 
view of the values that are morally relevant to the assessment of democracy. Hence, as it will 
become apparent immediately below, my goal is not to assess if the features that I consider below 
are morally relevant for the justification of democracy. I make the normative assumption that 
they are, and that they need to be balanced against each other (something that I do not attempt to 
do here either). My goal here is rather to analyze if such features are similarly present in firms 
and states. If the normative assumption turned out to be wrong, then the conclusions drawn from 
the present analysis would have to be reconsidered. 
The second reply is that, even if we accepted López-Guerra’s argument, the parallel-case 
argument could still hold. López-Guerra seems to believe that, if we prove that the exercise of 
power is not a relevant moral criterion (or not relevant enough to override some other criteria), 
we then also prove that the argument is invalid. But this is because he explicitly assumes that the 
parallel between firms and states has to be based on the exercise of power. To be sure, this has 
been the main basis in the existing literature, in which it has been assumed that democracy should 
be equally applied to firms and states because the same sort of power is exercised in both realms. 
However, there is no reason why the parallel-case argument could not be based on the similarity 
between firms and states regarding some other moral criteria (for example, how profoundly the 
decisions made by firms and states affect workers and citizens, respectively). And, once we 
accept this, it may be the case that firms and states are similar enough regarding these further 
criteria to make the argument work. 
 
4. SIMILARITIES 
 
Firms and states are similar in a number of ways.12  However, not all the features that firms and 
states share are equally suitable to be included in this category. These should be limited to those 
                                                
12 Here I refer to evaluative similarities, i.e. similarities in the values relevant to their assessment, rather than to non-
evaluative similarities (e.g. they both are ways of distributing decision-making powers between individuals). 
 12 
features that may satisfy premise (C2), i.e. those features that may be sufficient for the 
justification of democracy in the state. Now, different normative theories of democracy will 
provide different accounts of which precise features count as sufficient in justifying democracy in 
the state. For instance, pure instrumentalist theories will consider only process-independent 
features, such as welfare maximization or the protection of fundamental rights, while non-
instrumentalist theories will look at process-related features, such as the exercise of power by 
public officials.  
In the remainder of this subsection I will consider two similarities that have dominated recent 
debates and that are plausible candidates to justify democracy in the state. More specifically, I 
will briefly consider, first, the external and internal effects of firms and states and, second, the 
power exercised by managers and public officials. 
 
4.1. Effects 
 
Let us begin with one of the several principles by which democracy has been justified in the state. 
According to the principle of all-affected interests, all which interests are affected by a decision 
ought to have a say in that decision.13 Since the goal of this paper is not to consider which 
principles may justify democracy in the state but to assess whether such principles apply equally 
to firms and states, let us assume that the principle of all-affected interests is sufficient to justify 
democracy in the state. In considering whether it applies equally to both realms, we need to look 
at those individuals that are affected by decisions made by firms and by states and the extent to 
which their effects are similarly pervasive. We can distinguish between two sorts of effects—
namely, external effects (i.e. effects on individuals who are members of the two sort of 
institutions under consideration) and internal ones (i.e. effects on outsiders). Even though 
external effects turn out to be irrelevant for the issue at hand, let me briefly show why before 
turning to internal ones. 
It has been often argued that firms’ decisions have a pervasive influence beyond the limits of 
the firm, both social and political.14 Further, it has been claimed that such influence is as 
pervasive as the influence of states—if not more—in the case of large companies. For instance, in 
1999, General Motors’ annual revenue was larger than the revenue of the Netherlands, Exxon 
                                                
13 For a discussion and defense of the principle, see Goodin (2007). For a criticism, see Saunders (2012). 
14 As Néron (2010: 336) has put it, “[firms] control vast human, organizational, and financial resources, and labor; 
they influence national governments and local communities; and they support (directly and indirectly) everything 
from education to the arts and sports.” 
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Mobil’s revenue larger than Spain’s, DaimlerChrysler’s revenue larger than Canada’s, and so on 
(Chowla, 2005: 3). As such, large companies’ social and political influence often resembles, if 
not exceeds, that of states.  
However, this analogy is irrelevant for the issue at hand for at least two reasons.15 First, 
assuming that the analogy holds, it holds only—or to a much greater extent—for big businesses. 
The influence of small and medium businesses, by contrast, is not comparable to the influence of 
states. Second, even assuming that it holds for all firms, it does not have a bearing on the 
justification of democracy, neither within the state nor within firms. Under the principle of all-
affected interests, all stakeholders, and not only workers, would have to be granted a say over 
firms’ decisions. Similarly, aliens who are affected by the externalities of the state, and not only 
citizens, would have to be granted a say over its decisions. Accordingly, stakeholder democracy 
and global democracy would obtain, rather than democracy within the firm and within the state. 
Consider now the more interesting case of internal effects. It can be argued that decisions 
made by managers affect workers as much as decisions made by public officials and elected 
officials affect citizens. On the one hand, firms’ decisions can affect workers and their families 
directly through day-to-day commands or the setting up of the working conditions. For example, 
in Europe almost as many employees die on average due to fatal accidents in the workplace as 
citizens die due to intentional homicide.16 On the other hand, firms’ decisions can affect workers 
indirectly, as a side effect of strategic decisions such as production planning or relocation. The 
relevance of these internal effects is enhanced by two further facts. First, workers spend one third 
of their adult lives in their workplaces, probably more time than anywhere else. Second, given 
that work is a central source of self-esteem in modern economies, these effects do not have a 
merely instrumental importance to workers. They are also intrinsically important.17 In short, 
internal effects of firms’ decisions provide—assuming that the principle of all-affected interests 
suffices to justify democracy in the state—a robust candidate to ground the parallel-case 
argument.  
 
4.2. Standing 
 
                                                
15 I am grateful to two referees for this journal for pressing me to clarify this. 
16 In the EU there were 2.5 fatal accidents per 100,000 persons employed in 2008 and 3.5 intentional homicides per 
100,000 inhabitants in 2011. See Eurostat (2012: 190) and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Homicide 
statistics, at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html (accessed July 6, 2013).  
17 On normative issues related to work and self-esteem, see Schwartz (1982), Arneson (1992), and Moriarty (2009). 
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In defining the similarities between firms and states, most uses of the parallel-case argument have 
not focused on the influence of firms’ decisions in contrast with the influence of states. Rather, 
they have focused on workers’ standing in relation to firms as analogous to citizens’ standing in 
relation to the state and, notably, on the power exercised by managers and public officials.18 This 
is a feature that is often seen, at least in the state, as sufficient to justify granting control rights to 
those over whom such power is exercised (and, again, I will assume that this is the case). 
Accordingly, it is not very surprising that this type of the argument has been dominant. 
It is not very controversial that employees are subject to the power of their employers. In 
contrast to self-employment, in which workers exchange the product of their labor in the market, 
rather than their labor force, the very point of the employment relationship is the subordination of 
the worker to the command of the employer. In large firms, managers rather than owners exercise 
command as the representatives of the latter in the daily running of the firm. Managers, thus, 
have power over employees because they have the ability to make the latter perform actions that 
they would not otherwise perform. What is controversial, then, is not so much whether employers 
and managers have power over employees. It is clear that they do. And almost as matter of 
definition, since managers’ ability to issue directives to which employees have to conform is a 
core feature of the employment relationship. What is controversial is whether such power is 
similar to the power exercised by elected representatives and officials in the state. There are three 
potential differences between firms and states that might call into question that they are.  
The first potential difference is that the power exercised by employers is more heavily 
constrained than the power exercised by elected officials. This could be the case because 
employers and employees sign a labor contract at the outset of the relationship that clearly 
specifies the terms under which the relationship will be conducted. By contrast, citizens and 
elected governments do not sign any such contract. True, in democratic countries citizens elect 
their representatives. But the latter enjoy ample discretion once they have been elected. They are 
not subject by binding instructions from the former, or by their own party manifesto. (It might be 
argued that party manifestos are contracts, but this is at most metaphorical because, unlike labor 
contracts, they are not legally binding). Accordingly, while employers’ exercise of power is 
heavily constrained (by the employment contract), the exercise of power by elected officials is 
not. 
However, this difference is overdrawn. Neither the discretion of elected officials is completely 
unconstrained, nor is the discretion of managers completely constrained. In the state, elected 
                                                
18 Dahl (1985) is the classic reference relying on the power exercised within the firm. 
 15 
officials are legally constrained by vertical and horizontal forms of accountability. First, they are 
subject to regular elections, in which they need to be reelected. This poses a de facto constraint 
on the extent to which they can deviate from their electoral promises and party manifestos while 
in office. Second, their power is legally constrained by the constitution and the checks and 
balances of the other branches of the state. Managers in firms, on the other hand, enjoy ample 
discretionary powers beyond the terms of their employment contracts because such contracts turn 
out to be incomplete when they are applied to concrete cases and unforeseeable contingencies. 
Since it would be impossible or prohibitively costly to anticipate every detail and contingency at 
the outset of such contract, and since some flexibility is desirable to adequately address such 
contingencies, employers are unavoidably granted ample discretion to issue commands.19 
A second potential difference is that—unlike citizens in non-democratic states, who do not 
have a say over decisions imposed upon them by public officials—employees in non-democratic 
firms do have a say over decisions imposed upon them. This is because they can elect the public 
officials who regulate the exercise of power in the workplace, and who decide, for that matter, 
whether the workplace should be democratized or not. Once employees get their say in more 
general elections and are thus able to shape how corporations should operate, it may be argued, 
the case for democracy in the workplace turns becomes much weaker than the case for 
democracy in the state.  
This, however, does not make the power exercised by non-democratic managers of firms 
operating in democratic countries irrelevant. To see why, consider the case of a country in which 
democracy applies at the state level yet not at the municipal level. I take it that the fact that 
citizens can elect public officials at the state level does not make the power exercised by public 
officials at the municipal level irrelevant, even if the latter have to exercise their power within the 
democratic limits imposed by the former, just as it does not make the case for municipal 
democracy irrelevant. Analogously, the fact that workers have a say at the political level certainly 
makes a difference for the issue at hand, since it constrains the power that managers can exercise 
upon them. However, it does not make such power innocuous as far as managers enjoy some 
discretion (something that, as pointed out before, is intrinsic to the employment relationship), and 
it does not make the case for democracy in the workplace completely irrelevant as a result. 
A third potential difference is that the power exercised in the firm is more easily avoidable 
than the power exercised by public officials. As Arneson (1993: 139) has argued, employees can 
“generally escape the reach of ... unwanted policies by quitting one’s job and taking another.” 
                                                
19 I fully develop this argument in González-Ricoy (2014: 244-248). 
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Citizens, by contrast, cannot leave their country and enter another one so easily, if at all. The sort 
of power to which employees and citizens are subjected is, thus, very different. This is an 
important potential difference that might block the analogy, and it has been extensively discussed 
in the relevant literature. For now, however, let us put it aside, for it will be discussed in some 
detail immediately below in section 5.1. 
 
5. DIFFERENCES 
 
In the previous section I have argued that the similarities between firms and states regarding their 
internal effects, as well as their similarities with regard to the exercise of power within them, are 
good candidates to ground the parallel-case argument. Assume that this is correct—or that some 
further similarities between firms and states exist, and that such similarities are, other things 
being equal, sufficient to favor democracy both in the state and the firm. Even if that is the case, 
however, these similarities only provide pro tanto reasons in favor of workplace democracy. 
Further differences between the firm and the state may end up overriding them, thus blocking the 
justification of workplace democracy on balance. In this subsection I will focus on three potential 
differences. First, firms are voluntary associations while states are not. Second, firms have well-
defined purposes while states are open-ended. Third, firms face stiff competition by other firms 
while states do not face a similar competition by other states. 
 
5.1. Voluntariness 
 
The potential difference that has dominated the debates about the parallel case is that firms are 
voluntary associations while states are not. As Arneson (1993: 139) claims, “The most significant 
disanalogy between states and firms is voluntariness.” The reason for this, according to Arneson 
and others (Narveson, 1992; see also Dahl, 1985; Mayer 2000; Hsieh, 2008; Cordelli, 
unpublished), is that workers are entitled to leave economic enterprises at will, while leaving the 
state may be impossible or very costly. Two problems with how this debate has proceeded are (i) 
that the notion of voluntariness is rarely made explicit in full and (ii) that it is unclear whether the 
lack of exit rights necessarily entails that an association is involuntary (which most of the 
literature about the parallel-case argument assumes). Here I will not attempt to clarify these two 
problems. Rather, I will assume, following the relevant literature, that exit rights and the ability to 
exercise them without incurring excessive costs are necessary to deem an association voluntary. 
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When the members of an association lack exit rights, or the costs of exercising them are 
unbearable (say, because of the absence of acceptable alternatives), then their agreement cannot 
be deemed fully voluntary.20 In what follows, I will accordingly limit myself to discussing the 
potential differences between firms and states with this regard. 
The basic reason why exit rights are deemed so crucial for voluntariness is that, when the 
members of an association are entitled to leave it without incurring excessive costs, by remaining 
inside of it they are taken to consent to the terms of the association. From this standpoint, firms 
might have been involuntary associations in nineteenth-century England, when Master and 
Servant Acts were in force and employees were criminally prosecuted for quitting their jobs. And 
involuntariness may sometimes persist nowadays in monopsonistic labor markets, or in markets 
of forced labor.21 However, in free, competitive, and fully clearing labor markets, so the 
argument often goes, firms are voluntary associations because employees are entitled to quit at 
will.22 By contrast, states are involuntary because exit is impossible or prohibitively costly. 
Two important implications follow. The first one has to do with the analogy between firms 
and states regarding their internal effects and the exercise of power within them. While citizens 
can hardly escape such effects as well as the exercise of power by public officials, employees can 
generally avoid them by terminating their employment contracts. Further, employees can use 
such freedom as an implicit yet ever-present threat against their employers. As a result, the latter 
may well ex ante modify their behavior so as to incorporate the interests of their employees, thus 
minimizing the possibility of such freedom being exercised, thus reducing the employee turnover 
rate. This is not to say that freedom to exit completely rules out employers’ power over their 
employees, or that the latter are not be affected by the decisions of the former any longer. Rather, 
it means that employees are affected and subjected by such decisions very differently, and to a 
lesser extent, from how citizens are. 
The second implication follows from the first one. As I have argued in the previous section, 
the parallel-case argument can be grounded on the internal effects and the power exercised within 
firms and states being similar. Now, if they are not—because, unlike states, firms are voluntary 
                                                
20 Notice, however, that the sort of involuntariness that results from the lack of exit rights is different from the sort 
of involuntariness that would render a contract nonbinding, as Scanlon (2000: 245) suggests. The mere absence of 
exit rights does not exempt the parties, thus, from their duty to honor their agreements. 
21 According to the ILO’s Forced Labour Convention No. 29, forced labor is all work or service that is exacted from 
any person under the threat of a penalty and for which the person has not offered herself voluntarily. 
22 As a referee for this journal has suggested, markets might not need to fully clear for entry and exit from firms to be 
voluntary, provided that workers are sufficiently protected from unemployment, e.g. through employment benefits or 
a basic income. I have considered this alternative argument for the voluntariness of firms in “The Republican Case 
for Workplace democracy,” section 3. Here, however, I limit the analysis to the stronger argument according to 
which, even in the absence of such protection, entry and exit from firms in free and competitive markets is voluntary. 
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associations, which members are entitled to join and leave at will—then the argument for 
workplace democracy based on the analogy turns out to be blocked. As Bowles and Gintis (1993: 
97) put it, “if the capitalist economy is a sphere of voluntary private interactions, what is there to 
democratize?” Jan Narveson (1992: 53-54) nicely summarizes these two implications: 
 
“If a firm doesn’t like the way you do your job, can it send men with guns who 
will put you in prison if you don’t do it the way the boss says? ... It is fundamental to 
politics that political association is not essentially voluntary ... Once a gathering is 
plainly voluntary, then there simply is no case for imposing “democratic” structures 
and procedures on it.” 
 
However, this contrast between firms and states is overdrawn. Even though it is generally more 
costly to leave one’s country than to leave one’s job, the difference is one of degree, not of kind, 
for leaving one’s country is, at least formally, as possible as leaving one’s job. True, leaving 
one’s country is very costly. It includes serious obstacles such as closed borders, linguistic 
barriers, and travel expenses, in addition to the fact that moving from one country to another 
usually implies changing jobs, while one can change jobs without changing countries. However, 
leaving one’s job does not go without sacrifice either. 
Briefly consider the following reasons.23 First, imperfect labor markets do have involuntary 
unemployment, which makes it costly for employees to quit provided that they would not be able 
to find another job easily.24 Second, even if labor markets cleared, there are additional exit costs 
that can lock-in employees, including the following four: (i) investment costs in developing firm-
specific human capital; (ii) integration costs in the network of co-workers, customers, etc.; (iii) 
searching and transition costs from one job to another; (iv) psychological costs in quitting work 
altogether provided that work is a relevant source of self-esteem in modern societies. 
Third, in addition to these costs, freedom to exit, even when costless, may not be sufficient for 
voluntariness when the alternatives are not acceptable. To see why, consider the following case:25 
 
A is an employee who toils in a humiliating job and wishes to change jobs. For A, 
leaving her present job is both available and costless. As the labor market fully clears, 
                                                
23 I have developed these reasons in more detail in González-Ricoy (2014: 239-241). 
24 Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) have shown that, under conditions of imperfect information, this is also the case in 
perfectly competitive markets, which need a sufficiently large unemployment rate to remain competitive. 
25 Serena Olsaretti (1998: 71) advances a similar example. 
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A has numerous job alternatives available. However, all these alternatives are as 
humiliating as her present job. Eventually, A decides not to quit and stays at her 
present job.  
 
Is A’s decision fully voluntary? I take it that most of us would respond in the negative (even 
though, as I said above in note 20, not in a sense that would render A’s labor contract 
nonbinding), which shows that freedom to exit does not always suffice for voluntariness. When 
the range of options available to us is not acceptable, then formal exit rights, which A in the case 
above holds, do not suffice for voluntariness. 
In short, leaving one’s job may be less costly than leaving one’s country. However, this is a 
difference of degree, not of kind, for leaving one’s job also has important costs. In addition, when 
acceptable alternatives are absent, freedom to exit, even when costless, does not suffice for 
voluntariness (even though, as I said above, not in a sense of “voluntary” that would render the 
contracts of its members nonbinding). Accordingly, any conclusion on the justification of 
democracy in the workplace drawn from the parallel-case argument would be less compelling 
than the corresponding justification of democracy in the state. Yet it would not be forceless. 
Consider now two objections.26 First, it might be argued that the mentioned costs, as well as 
the circumstances in which exit rights may be insufficient for involuntariness, vary enormously 
across employees and firms. For example, employees who possess scarce and valuable skills may 
bear lower costs if they quit than employees who lack such skills. However, these differences are 
also present in the state, in which exit costs are also very unevenly distributed across citizens and 
different states. Hence, some citizens might find it more costly to leave their country than others, 
and some countries may make it more costly for their citizens to leave than others. Accordingly, 
the analogy between firms and states regarding these differences holds and if democracy is 
justified in the state despite these differences, then it follows that it is justified in firms as well. 
Second, even if democracy may be favored both in the state and in the workplace due to their 
similarly profound and unavoidable effects on citizens and workers, respectively, it may be 
objected that this argument can be blocked by appealing to the idea of freedom of economic 
association. Workers, it may be argued, have a right to freedom of economic association that 
empowers them to bind themselves to agree to obey commands of a non-democratic firm, and 
they have this power even if their set of valuable alternatives is very limited. I raise two points in 
                                                
26 I am grateful to a referee for this journal and to Andrew Williams for raising these objections. 
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response. First, as Joshua Cohen (1989: 48) has claimed in response to a similar objection, while 
it may be valuable to be able to choose the economic activity in which one engages as well as the 
parties with whom one associates, there may not be any fundamental interest protected by the 
liberty to sell labor for a wage and to be subjected to undemocratic command in the workplace 
instead of, say, working as a member of a co-operative. Second, even if we assume that the 
freedom of economic association does entail a right to work for non-democratic firms, this 
freedom does not necessarily override workers’ right to workplace democracy. Even though these 
two rights may sometimes conflict with each other, in the sort of economy envisaged by most 
proponents of workplace democracy—in which workplace democracy (unlike, say, mandatory 
schooling) is a right that can be alienated—it is not entirely implausible that both rights coexist.27 
 
5.2. Narrowness of purposes 
 
Consider now a further yet related difference, namely, that firms are justified in having well-
defined purposes, e.g. to maximize profits, while states ought to be open-ended, as Phillips and 
Margolis (1999) have argued. The reason for this is that, unlike firms, states are not voluntary 
associations. Firms are justified in having narrow purposes their employees can always leave if 
they disagree with such purposes. States, by contrast, have to remain open-ended because their 
citizens cannot leave them easily if they disagree. Hence, while it is acceptable for a firm to have 
certain narrow goals (say, produce and sell copies of the Bible), it is unacceptable for the state to 
do so. 
An implication of this difference for the issue at hand is the following. When the goals of an 
organization are well defined and disagreement about them among its members is not very 
profound, the need for a collective decision-making procedure, democratic or otherwise, to set 
the goals that ought to be pursued is also weaker.28 When, by contrast, goals are subject to more 
profound disagreements, the need for a decision-making procedure to handle such disagreements 
is stronger. It thus follows that if states are open-ended and have plural goals while firms have 
narrow purposes, then the case for democratic procedures in the state is stronger than the case for 
                                                
27 According to Bowles and Gintis (1996: 66), for example, “to argue against mandatory workplace democracy is to 
critique a straw man and to elide the fundamental issue, which concerns whether policies promoting workplace 
democracies are justified in the interest of giving workers the opportunity to participate in these forms of 
governance.”  
28 As Przeworski (2006: 312) has put it, democracy presupposes, as a necessary condition, that “Interests or values 
are in conflict. If they were not, if interests were harmonious or values were unanimously shared, anyone’s decisions 
would be accepted by all, so that anyone could be a benevolent dictator.” A similar argument can be found in 
Waldron (1999) and Valentini (2012). 
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democratic procedures in the firm. 
There are good reasons, however, to resist this clear-cut distinction. Firstly, according to 
Phillips and Margolis, purpose narrowness is allowed in firms and open-endedness is required in 
the state due to the fact that the former are voluntary organizations while the latter are not. 
However, as we have seen in the previous section, this difference is overdrawn, for exit from 
firms is often costly and the decision to stay, thus, not always fully voluntary (at least under the 
definition of voluntariness used before, which requires that meaningful exit rights are available 
and that does not necessarily render employment contracts nonbinding). Now, if firms are not 
fully voluntary associations, then the case for purpose narrowness becomes weaker and the 
difference between firms and states regarding the narrowness of their goals becomes less clear-
cut. 
There are further reasons to call into question that purpose narrowness should be allowed in 
firms and open-endedness should be required in the state. On the one hand, it is certainly the case 
that some libertarians have argued not only that making profits is perfectly respectable for 
economic enterprises, but also that it should be their only goal (typically, Friedman, 1970). 
However, this position has not gone without challenge, not least by Corporate Social 
Responsibility approaches and stakeholder theorists. Indeed, it is widely assumed nowadays that 
firms should have a diversity of goals, social and otherwise, other than maximizing profits. On 
the other hand, the requirement of open-endedness in the state can also be called into question. 
Today, it is widely accepted that states have to comply with a number of narrow goals that 
constrain their sovereignty, including the fulfillment of human rights and the responsibility to 
protect their population.29 
In short, neither firms ought to have narrow purposes, nor the state ought to be completely 
open-ended. Of course, this does not imply that firms and states ought to have similar goals (just 
as different firms have different goals). It rather implies that the difference between firms and 
states regarding the narrowness of their goals is less clear-cut than it is sometimes argued and 
that, given that firms should also have plural purposes, the argument for ruling out the use of 
democratic procedures in their governance turns out to be less compelling. 
 
5.3. Toughness and efficiency 
 
Jeffrey Moriarty (2005) has advanced a further difference that may have a bearing on the 
                                                
29 A classic contemporary defense of human rights as constraints on state sovereignty is Rawls (1999). 
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assessment of the parallel-case argument, namely, the tougher environment that firms face in the 
market compared to states in the international realm. In free-market economies, firms face stiff 
competition from other firms that attempt to drive them out from the market. They face 
continuous and rapid changes due to the appearance of new technologies and products, changes 
in consumers’ preferences, the introduction of new legislation, periodical economic downturns 
that make them likely to disappear, and so on. Indeed, the US Census Bureau reports that the one-
year failure rate for firms started in 2004 is 23.6 percent and the five-year failure rate for firms 
started in 2000 is 49.3 percent (Headd, 2010). By contrast, states face a less tough environment. 
They are much more resilient to changing circumstances, and their downfall is rare or at least 
rarer than in the case of firms.  
Two relevant implications follow from this difference. First, Moriarty claims that managers in 
firms should be granted extensive powers to face stiff competition in the market, as well as the 
ability to exercise them fast, that public officials need not have or not to the same extent. In times 
of economic downturn, he reckons, managers may need to be able to cut employees’ pay, give 
shareholders smaller returns, or renegotiate contracts with suppliers, provided that some minimal 
constraints (e.g. safety conditions) are respected. Public officials, by contrast, need not have this 
sort of power, or not to the same degree. The environment they face is less tough, and dissolution 
of the state less likely to ever happen. Second, even though this is a point that Moriarty does not 
make, it may also be claimed that stiff competition and the constant threat of downfall make 
efficiency, in terms of the ratio of output to input, more important in the firm than in the state. 
The bearing of these two implications on the parallel-case argument is that both the need for 
extensive prerogatives and the crucial importance of efficiency may conflict with democratic 
decision-making, which may be too slow to adapt to changing environments, and may be less 
efficient than other decision-making arrangements.30 Accordingly, since the need for extensive 
prerogatives and the importance of efficiency due to stiff competition is greater in the firm than 
in the state, democratic decision-making may be less suitable in the former than in the latter. 
These differences, in turn, may block the parallel-case argument for democracy in the workplace 
or, at least, make any conclusion drawn from other similarities that firms and states may share 
less compelling. 
This is an important argument for, as the figures above suggest, firms certainly face stiffer 
competition than states. Three replies can be advanced, though. First, governments also face 
                                                
30 Classic references on the inefficiency of democratic firms are Jensen and Meckling (1979) and Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972). 
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tough circumstances, and the availability of emergency powers and the importance of efficiency 
may also be crucial in the governance of the state. As Moriarty acknowledges, the difference 
between firms and states in this regard is one of degree, not of kind.31 Second, as it has been 
argued above, democracy in the workplace is not at odds with delegation of extensive 
prerogatives to managers, with the only difference that managers in democratic firms are 
appointed by workers rather than, or along with, shareholders, and accountable to them. Third, it 
has been much discussed whether democracy in the workplace diminishes or improves 
efficiency.32 This issue largely exceeds the scope of this paper. However, it may be too quick to 
assume that efficiency is at odds with democracy, either in the workplace or in the state. There 
are good theoretical and empirical grounds to believe that the contrary may be the case, at least 
under certain circumstances (see Bowles and Gintis, 1993; Parks et al., 2004; Levin, 2006; for 
overviews of the debates, see Dow, 2003; and Hansmann, 2000). 
In short, the difference in toughness that firms and states face is one of degree. It should not be 
overdrawn when assessing the limits to the parallel between firms and states. In addition, the 
difference might turn out not to have much bearing on the parallel-case argument, first, because 
democratic firms are consistent with the sort of powers that tough market competition may 
require and, second, because, they may not be inefficient in their operation. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
If the features upon which the analogy between firms and states is based turn out to be sufficient 
to justify democracy in the state, then the parallel-case argument provides a plausible reason in 
favor of democracy in the workplace—a reason, however, that needs to be importantly qualified, 
I conclude, for a number of reasons. First, while the paper has shown that firms and states are 
similar regarding their internal effects and the power exercised within them, it has not attempted 
to demonstrate that these features are morally sufficient to justify democracy in the state. Second, 
the paper has shown that there are a number of morally relevant differences that could override, 
or at least undermine, the similarities upon which the analogy between firms and states is 
                                                
31 As Andrew Williams has suggested to me, it may be argued that competition is not only a fact but also a desirable 
fact in the economic domain, given the benefits of creative destruction. The same, however, may not be true in the 
political domain, since the social costs of political bankruptcy are so much higher. While this may entail that the 
difference is ultimately of kind, I leave it open whether the difference holds, for it implies a moral assessment of the 
benefits of competition that, regarding the economic domain, is highly contested to say the least. 
32 Some have argued that the fact that democratic firms are marginal shows that democratic firms are not efficient, 
for otherwise they would be created voluntarily. See Jensen and Meckling (1979). Elster (1989) has replied that they 
could be marginal due to endogenous preference formation, adverse selection, discrimination, and externalities. 
 24 
based—even though it has also shown that these differences are often overdrawn, for they are of 
degree, not of kind. Third, further differences that have not been considered here may further 
undermine the analogy between firms and states, thus blocking the parallel-case argument in 
favor of workplace democracy. In short, the case for democracy in the workplace, when drawn 
from the analogy between firms and states, and provided that democracy is justified in the state, 
is plausible. Yet it is also not as strong as the case for democracy in the state. McMahon (1994: 
259) is thus right in acknowledging that “the case for democracy in nongovernmental 
organizations is weaker than the case for democratic government,” at least, when based upon the 
parallel-case argument.  
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